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 Executive summary 
Information-based regulation is using information to drive behaviour change to achieve 
social, environmental or public policy objectives. This set of regulatory alternatives has the 
potential to help ease pressure on regulatory budgets while also improving firm 
compliance behaviours and achieving regulatory goals. However, challenges remain in 
understanding the types of information-based regulation, when it might be effective and 
the role of regulators in its delivery. 
The focus of this research is on using information-based regulation to influence firm 
behaviours within the environmental, energy and food policy areas. Our project is the first 
to collate evidence from academic research, international experience and current UK case 
examples on roles for regulators in information-based regulation. 
Overall, the project addressed the following questions: 
1. What are the main types of information-based regulation that may be used to influence 
firm compliance in the energy, environment and food areas?  
2. What are the contemporary trends in information-based regulation, and what 
challenges do these pose to future regulatory design, delivery and enforcement? 
3. What roles can regulators play in using information-based regulation to assure and 
enforce regulatory compliance? 
4. What can policy makers learn from the academic literature, international experience 
and from contemporary UK pilot schemes on successful information-based regulation 
in energy, environment and food? 
1. Types of information-based regulation 
Information-based regulation incorporates a wide range of schemes that encourage firms 
to generate and share information about their social or environmental performance. 
Popular examples include labelling schemes such as ecolabels on products or food 
hygiene scores posted on restaurant doors, audit schemes that provide frameworks for 
firms to examine and publicise their performance, and registries such as online pollution 
inventories. All of these schemes have in common the idea that providing more information 
allows customers, investors, regulators and other regulators to make better-informed 
decisions. While there is considerable diversity among the schemes, our project identified 
patterns in the types of information-based regulation. 
The report develops a new general typology of information-based regulation based on 
whether information disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, and on whether disclosure is 
about compliance or beyond compliance firm behaviours. Mapping schemes within the 
typology allows regulators to generate regulatory options beyond mandatory disclosures of 
firm compliance.  
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To illustrate how the different types work in practice, we present three contemporary 
cases: 
• The Statutory Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) in Wales (Type 1: Mandatory 
and beyond compliance) 
• The US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Audit Policy (Type 2: Voluntary 
and compliance) 
• The Environment Agency’s EPR Assurance Scheme Pilot (Type 3: Voluntary and 
beyond compliance)  
The voluntary schemes showed evidence of lower costs of enforcement and inspection, 
while achieving no deterioration on overall average compliance. The mandatory scheme 
showed evidence of improving compliance standards, but incurred some additional 
coordination costs to regulators (which were partly offset by cost recovery).  
However, all the schemes also faced limitations, including: an unintended focus on minor 
compliance infractions; firms reporting little or no savings compared with traditional 
regulation; loss of face-to-face contact between firms and regulators; and standardisation 
and consistency of auditors, inspectors or certification bodies. 
2. Contemporary trends in information-based regulation 
We identify three generations in the development of information-based regulation. In the 
first generation, the focus was on improving government accountability through 
transparency (‘right-to-know’). The second generation focused more on reducing 
information asymmetry to manage risks to the public and raise the quality of firm 
behaviours (‘targeted transparency’). The current generation, ‘smart disclosure’, 
emphasises the potential to generate public value from distributed data. This recent shift 
has been facilitated by new technologies such as cheap sensors and big data analytics. In 
the smart disclosure era, regulators face the challenge of how to influence information 
flows to help consumers and businesses make better-informed decisions.  
3. Roles for regulators 
The primary contribution of our report is that it draws together the many roles that 
regulators can play in information-based regulation beyond simply mandating disclosure. 
Regulators can play an expanding range of roles in information-based schemes that may 
be used to assure regulatory compliance. These roles include activities such as: 
• Setting the regulatory framework (e.g. setting information standards, proposing 
voluntary guidelines, providing incentives to disclose) 
• Making government information widely accessible (e.g. setting standard indicators, 
maintaining online databases) 
 • Developing public information programmes (e.g. public education campaigns, 
technical assistance to firms) 
• Delegating authority to a third party standard-setting body (e.g. funding or endorsing 
standards organisations) 
• Assuring others’ information (e.g. assuring third-party schemes and data credibility) 
• Formatting, displaying and aggregating data (e.g. proposing or endorsing data 
standards) 
The capabilities regulators need to fulfil these roles are evolving as regulatory approaches 
change from right-to-know through targeted transparency to smart disclosure. The report 
concludes that for successful information-based regulation, regulators need to develop 
new capabilities and relationships in intermediation, standard-setting, data and information 
management, certification and enforcement.  
4. Key messages for policy makers and regulators 
Despite the theoretical potential of information-based regulation, evidence of many types 
of schemes working is currently inconclusive. There are few well-designed evaluation 
studies, and the robust studies that have been completed note many weaknesses in 
information-based regulation in practice. The effectiveness of information-based regulation 
depends on a wide range of factors including: issue risk, consumer and stakeholder 
interest, firm incentives, information simplicity, trust and credibility, timing, commitment, 
and the attitudes of senior managers. 
Evidence suggests that small changes in implementation can make a large difference in 
the effects and effectiveness of information-based regulation schemes. Scheme success 
depends on assurance and credibility of the process; the most successful schemes are the 
ones that operate ‘in the shadow of the regulator’. Thus while information-based regulation 
can be used to influence firm behaviours within the environmental, energy and food 
domains, it is most effective when it is backed by a credible commitment to more direct 
intervention if necessary.  
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 Introduction 
The environment, food and energy policy areas share common policy challenges on how 
to reduce risks to the public and encourage businesses to raise quality standards at the 
lowest overall costs to society. Regulators need to find ways to manage public health 
hazards such as food-borne illnesses from poor restaurant hygiene, obesity from food 
ingredients or local pollution. They also need to address environmental hazards such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, waste disposal or water over-use. Since businesses often 
contribute to these public health and environmental hazards through their industrial 
processes or final products, regulators have focused on influencing the behaviours of 
firms. 
Traditionally, regulators have regulated firms through one of two routes. First, firm 
behaviours underlying public risks and quality performance have been altered through 
direct command-and-control regulation, such as through prohibiting certain practices or 
mandating that particular technologies be used. Second, firm behaviours have been 
influenced through altering incentives in market-based schemes, such as imposing a tax 
on waste to landfill or subsidizing cleaner energy. 
Information-based regulation developed as a third alternative as weaknesses emerged in 
both direct command-and-control and market-based policy instruments. Information-based 
regulation occurs when information is used as a primary mechanism for driving changes in 
behaviours to achieve social, environmental or public policy objectives. This so-called 
‘third wave’ of governance emphasises attempts to increase the availability of information 
to influence individuals’ or firms’ choices (Tietenberg, 1998). Increased disclosure can 
reduce risk to the public as stakeholders make better-informed decisions. Disclosure can 
also raise performance standards as providers compete to signal good reputations on 
policy issues.  
Information-based regulation has the potential to help ease pressure on regulatory 
budgets while also improving firm regulatory performance and achieving regulatory goals. 
However, challenges remain in understanding the types of information-based regulation, 
when it might be effective and the role of regulators in this new set of regulatory 
alternatives. 
Project aims 
This project collated evidence from academic research, international experience and 
current UK case examples on roles for regulators in information-based regulation. We 
focused on regulations within the environmental, energy and food policy areas to enable a 
deeper analysis, but generated an analytical description that may be applicable to other 
areas of non-economic regulation. 
More specifically, our project supports the evidence base of the Better Regulation 
Executive (BRE) and the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) through achieving the 
following aims: 
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• Aim 1: Collate and evaluate the academic research evidence on the roles of 
regulators in information-based regulation in compliance assurance and 
enforcement in energy, environment and food policy. 
• Aim 2: Develop general lessons from specific case examples to illustrate the 
principles of regulatory roles in information-based regulation in these policy areas, 
and communicate them in a form accessible to regulatory agencies and their 
stakeholders.  
 
Report structure 
This report is organised into five primary sections: 
Section 1: Introduction, including project aims and structure 
Section 2: Background and literature, including key definitions and an introduction to 
the history and theory of information-based regulation. This section concludes with the 
main research questions driving the project. 
Section 3: Research method, which outlines the methods used in the two main phases of 
the research. The project included a rapid evidence assessment of 124 academic articles 
published between 1976 and 2014 on information-based regulation, and three illustrative 
case studies. 
Section 4: Findings, including an overview of the schemes we identified through the rapid 
evidence assessment, evidence on the effectiveness of information-based regulation 
schemes, and an assessment of the roles for regulators. In this section, we develop a new 
typology of information-based regulation schemes and then provide three illustrative cases 
of how each type of scheme works in practice. 
Section 5: Conclusion and future directions, draws our analysis together and shows 
how the role of regulators in information-based regulation is changing over time. We also 
suggest some areas for future academic research and evaluation studies. 
  
 Background and literature 
In this section, we position information-based regulation within its policy and theoretical 
context. We begin with a definition of information-based regulation and some common 
examples to give a sense of the range of the phenomenon. We then outline the history and 
theory of information-based regulation. We conclude this section with the main research 
questions driving the project. 
What is information-based regulation? 
Information-based regulation is using information to drive behaviour change to achieve 
social, environmental or public policy objectives. While this general definition can 
incorporate both individual and firm behaviours relating to any public policy area, the focus 
of this research is on using information-based regulation to influence firm behaviours 
within the environmental, energy and food policy areas. Information-based regulation 
incorporates a wide range of schemes that generate and share information about firms’ 
social or environmental performance. 
Examples of information-based regulation included within scope for this report include 
mandatory requirements on firms to provide information about their products on labels 
(e.g. nutritional information on food products), to disclose ratings about their performance 
(e.g. restaurant hygiene scores in Wales; Energy Performance Certificates for buildings in 
Scotland) or to report their performance to government registers (e.g. online pollution 
inventory). Information-based regulation also includes an ever-expanding range of 
voluntary disclosures that could be used in compliance assurance such as environmental 
reports, certifications, voluntary disclosures of non-compliance, or other publicly available 
data that might be aggregated and linked through big data analytic techniques. 
Information-based regulation has the potential to help ease pressure on regulatory 
budgets while also improving firm regulatory performance and achieving regulatory goals. 
However, challenges remain in understanding the types of information-based regulation, 
when it might be effective and the roles of regulators in this new set of regulatory 
alternatives. 
History and contemporary trends 
In order to understand contemporary trends in information-based regulation, it is 
worthwhile to consider where this type of regulation came from and how it has evolved 
over time. 
Table 1 outlines three generations in the development of information-based regulation. 
The trend towards disclosure in regulatory processes began with generic ‘right-to-know’ 
policies in the US from the 1960s onwards, requiring general openness in government in 
order to hold public officials to account (Florini, 2007; Mol, 2010). This changed the 
dynamics of previously closed information flows between ‘expert’ firms and regulators to 
include broader information sharing and deliberation (Gouldson, 2004), but has also been 
criticized for maintaining power structures (Mason, 2008). The right-to-know frame 
 11 
 
emphasizes transparency of governance, with governments and state actors disclosing 
information to citizens as part of an accountability assurance agenda (Mitchell, 2011). 
More open deliberation required information, eventually leading to calls for mandatory 
disclosure schemes such as the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) in 1986 (Konar & Cohen, 1997). Since then, over 50 countries 
have launched similar pollutant release and transfer registers (PRTRs), including England 
and Wales in 1998 (Gouldson, 2004). These schemes are examples of second-generation 
‘targeted transparency’ schemes, where firms are required to disclose specific factual 
information to support better stakeholder decision-making (Fung, Graham, & Weil, 2007). 
Targeted transparency shifts from transparency of governance to transparency for 
governance (Mitchell, 2011). It is more focused than generic right-to-know disclosure, as 
“government compels companies or agencies to disclose information in standardized 
formats” (Weil, Graham, & Fung, 2013: 1410). The goal is to mandate simplified 
information disclosure to ‘nudge’ consumers at the time that they make their decisions (Ho, 
2012). Early successes in PRTRs such as the TRI have encouraged schemes in a wide 
variety of sectors from food hygiene ratings to building energy efficiency certificates, and 
beyond to vehicle safety scores, school inspection ratings, research audits at universities 
and publishing surgeons’ success rates.  
The most recent shift has been facilitated by new technologies such as cheap sensors, 
open data standards and big data analytics. ‘Smart disclosure’ is the ‘timely release of 
complex information and data in standardised, machine readable formats in ways that 
enable consumers to make informed decisions’ (Sunstein, 2011: 2). Simply mandating 
disclosure through targeted transparency can lead to data overload and confusion, so 
smarter disclosure involves processing data to generate decision-relevant data (Bae et al., 
2010). Further, while targeted transparency emphasises focused, mandatory disclosures 
to overcome information asymmetries, in the ‘smart disclosure’ era technology enables the 
aggregation of distributed data from a variety of sources. Government initiatives such as 
Obama’s ‘Open Government’ approach in the US and the UK government’s appreciation 
of the value of public sector information encourage making government data readily 
available and easy to parse an end in itself (Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
(BIS), 2013; Weil et al., 2013). Combined with corporate disclosures, customer usage data 
and distributed sensors, open data standards are shaping a new informational 
environment and offering new opportunities to information intermediaries (Thaler & Tucker, 
2013).  
For example, in the environmental area, context-aware technology such as mobile 
services and location tagging mean that “we are moving toward a world in which states, 
regulators, citizens, and industry will have real-time electronic information regarding 
environmental conditions, emissions and compliance” (Giles, 2013). The smart disclosure 
generation of information-based regulation is both more distributed and more personal 
(Shadbolt, 2013). This poses new challenges to policy-makers and regulators who will 
need guidance on the types, trends and effectiveness of regulatory interventions, and 
sound advice on the various roles they might play in harnessing information that they 
cannot directly control to assure regulatory compliance. 
 
 Table 1: The three generations of information-based regulation 
 Right-to-Know 
 
 
(1960s onward) 
 
Targeted 
Transparency  
 
(1980s onward) 
Smart Disclosure 
 
 
(2000s onward) 
Policy 
objective 
Improve 
government 
accountability 
through 
transparency 
Reduce information 
asymmetry to manage 
risks to the public and 
raise provider quality 
Generate public value from 
distributed data 
Primary 
disclosers Government Firms 
Governments, firms, 
individual consumers 
Primary 
users 
Citizens and other 
stakeholders (incl. 
NGOs) 
Consumers 
Information intermediaries 
(incl. government, app 
developers etc.) 
Enablers 
Legal:  
Freedom of 
Information Acts 
(primarily USA federal 
act in 1966) 
Legal:  
Freedom of Information 
Acts introduced in other 
developed countries in 
1980s and 90s 
Technology:  
Web-based inventories; 
cheaper communication 
Technology:  
Cheap and distributed 
sensors; big data analytics; 
open data standards 
Illustrative 
references 
Florini (2007) 
Mol (2010) 
Fung et al. (2007) 
Mitchell (2011) 
Lee (2010) 
Tietenberg (1998) 
 
Shadbolt (2013) 
Sigit Sayogo et al. (2014) 
Thaler & Tucker (2013) 
 
 
Information flows, social actors and behaviour change 
Information-based regulation relies on information flows between different social actors 
that might influence behaviour change. The primary social actors involved are the set of 
regulators (policy-makers, government departments and their agencies) and the regulated 
firms. However, information-based regulation is about more than direct information flows 
between the regulator and the regulated. Rather, information useful for regulatory 
purposes flows within and between the regulator, regulated and other social actors, often 
outside the control of regulators or the regulated firms (see Figure 1). The extent to which 
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information can change behaviour differs according to whether the information is private to 
the regulator and regulated, or it is more widely available to other social actors such as a 
firm’s competitors, the media, local communities or NGOs (Delmas & Lessem, 2014). 
Private information can be useful to generate learning and assurance; public information 
can trigger reputational effects as firms strive to signal their sound performance. 
Figure 1: Information flows in energy, environment and food regulation 
 
Information disclosure can drive changes in business behaviours either directly or 
indirectly through the reactions of consumers, investors, media and other social actors. 
Direct behaviour changes include firms’ adaptations to internal processes and procedures 
to be able to disclose information that was not required before. As regulators place 
information obligations, guidance and mandatory requirements on firms, firms need to 
change their internal practices to be able to deliver on these obligations (see flow between 
regulator and regulated in Figure 1). Simply implementing an internal measurement, 
reporting and disclosure system can improve managers’ awareness of firms’ processes 
and potential efficiencies.  
As Banks and Redgrove (2012) demonstrated in the context of energy behaviours and 
decision-making in businesses, managers do not make efficient resource decisions partly 
due to lack of information about their own impacts. For example, mandatory energy audits 
that require firms to collect and analyse energy consumption data can improve firms’ own 
information about their own impacts, ultimately leading to energy efficiency improvements. 
Energy audit schemes have been introduced in Australia (Martinov-Bennie & Hoffman, 
2012), China (Shen, Price, & Lu, 2012), and Germany (Fleiter, Schleich, & Ravivanpong, 
2012) to improve firms’ own information. However, these schemes have had less success 
in direct behaviour change than had been hoped because of the social dynamics and 
political interests around new auditing practices (Martinov-Bennie & Hoffman, 2012; 
 Power, 1996) and other barriers to change such as up-front capital costs for small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (Fleiter et al., 2012). 
Information-based regulation can also drive indirect behaviour changes within the broader 
markets and social structures that information flows are embedded (Fung et al., 2007). For 
example, Lee (2010) highlighted the difference between a direct effect of internal learning 
from the indirect effects of stakeholders (such as capital markets and NGOs) using 
information from a pollution disclosure scheme. Others emphasise consumer choice in 
using disclosures to reward or punish firm behaviours (e.g. Gallastegui, 2002; Horne, 
2009). While different stakeholders have different information needs, mandating or 
encouraging corporate disclosures can assist a range of social actors in determining 
whether a firm is meeting their expectations (Kolk, 1999). Indeed, as Gouldson (2004) 
pointed out, new pollution information requirements in the late 1990s in England and 
Wales led to the emergence of new cooperative alliances between pressure groups and 
regulators as each sought to improve firms’ environmental performance (see links between 
regulators and others in Figure 1). 
The intended outcome of information-based regulation is to reduce risks to the public 
and/or improve performance quality standards. It is vital to differentiate between whether a 
scheme has effects – whether direct or indirect – and whether it is ultimately effective. As 
Fung (2007: 54) put it: “A policy has effects when the information it produces enters the 
calculus of users and they consequently change their actions… A system is effective, 
however, only when discloser responses significantly advance policy aims.” Thus, 
behaviour change alone is not the ultimate goal of information-based regulation, but rather 
behaviour change that positively impacts on the regulatory issue at hand. Despite an 
increasing interest in information-based regulation as an alternative to traditional 
regulatory approaches, too little research connects information flows with behaviour 
change effects, and even less research evaluates effectiveness. 
Information-based regulation offers the potential to trigger qualitatively different 
behavioural responses in firms compared with focusing on reducing the transaction costs 
of information (Fung et al., 2007; Sunstein, 2013). Initial evidence suggests that the 
potential of using information to shape behaviour change may vary according to:  
• The availability of the information - whether the information is private to the firm 
and/or regulators, or is publicly available to others.  
• Whether the scheme is based on mandatory or voluntary information disclosure. 
• The role of information in the regulatory process – whether information is used in 
delivering regulatory commitments or shaping social norms. 
• Who provides the information - the firm, the regulator or other third party. 
• The informational context - using social or historical reference points for 
comparison. 
• Who assures the quality of the information – first-, second- or third-party assurance, 
and whether regulators are involved. 
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However, this evidence base is still dispersed across disciplines, geographical areas and 
policy domains. Gathering together the evidence on new roles for regulators in 
information-based regulation will provide more regulatory confidence and help incentivise 
alternative approaches among policy-makers and regulators. 
Research questions 
Given the state of the current academic literature outlined above, this project addressed 
the research questions: 
1. What are the main types of information-based regulation that may be used to influence 
firm compliance in the energy, environment and food areas?  
2. What are the contemporary trends in information-based regulation, and what 
challenges do these pose to future regulatory design, delivery and enforcement? 
3. What roles can regulators play in using information-based regulation to assure and 
enforce regulatory compliance? 
4. What might policy makers learn from the academic literature, international experience 
and from contemporary UK pilot schemes on successful information-based regulation 
in energy, environment and food? 
  
 Research method 
The project was implemented in two phases: a rapid evidence assessment exercise and a 
more in depth analysis of three illustrative cases of regulatory schemes. 
Phase 1: Desk research – rapid evidence assessment 
The first step was to conduct a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) using established 
guidelines to provide an overview of the evidence on a constrained topic and an outline 
synthesis of the evidence. REA’s are particularly appropriate when there is extensive 
research on a subject but critical questions still remain unanswered, as in the case of 
information-based regulation. A particular challenge is that the phrase ‘information-based 
regulation’ is not used consistently or commonly in the academic literature, so significant 
work was needed to define and scope the relevant literature to be included in this review.  
Rapid Evidence Assessment Question: What roles have regulators and 
their agencies played in using information to influence firms’ behaviours 
and strategies in the energy, environment and food policy areas? 
 
The formulation of the REA question was agreed with the steering committee in the project 
inception meeting. We were mindful throughout of the trade-offs inherent in REAs, 
particularly between comprehensiveness and resources available. Given the invitation in 
this call to conduct academic research on regulatory issues, we focused on peer-reviewed, 
rigorous journal articles rather than all the grey literature available. While excluding 
unpublished or grey literature findings may have introduced some bias into our review, this 
disadvantage is outweighed by gaining academic legitimacy through focusing on more 
generalizable, peer-reviewed studies. We also reincorporated some of the grey literature, 
including government evaluations of particular schemes, when researching the illustrative 
case studies in phase 2 of the research. A total of 124 academic articles were coded to 
generate the review findings. Details about this process are provided in the technical 
appendix.  
Phase 2: Illustrative cases and interviews 
We complemented our initial desk research on the academic evidence with interviews with 
key informants on illustrative case studies of contemporary UK pilot schemes and 
international examples. The goal of this phase was to illustrate and emphasise general 
points from the Phase 1 REA and provide tangible illustrations of information-based 
regulation in action. We selected the three case studies to illustrate each of the types of 
schemes identified in the literature search. The selection rationale is explained in more 
detail in the study findings. Our case study findings are based on documentary evidence 
complemented by interviews with key informants for each case (seven interview 
participants in total).  
Case 1: The Statutory Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) in Wales 
Display of Food Hygiene Rating stickers was made mandatory in all food premises in 
Wales since November 2013. The focus of our analysis is on the transition to mandatory 
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display in Wales and its impact on all parties involved (consumers, food businesses, local 
authorities, the Food Standards Agency). 
Case 2: The US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Audit Policy 
In 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency in the USA launched a voluntary disclosure 
policy commonly known as the EPA Audit Policy. The EPA Audit Policy has been one of 
the most visible voluntary compliance disclosure schemes with an accumulated 
experience of 20 years. The focus of our analysis is on the evolution of compliance and 
incentives to disclose voluntarily, responses from the firms and future plans about the role 
of the regulator. 
Case 3: The Environment Agency’s EPR Assurance Scheme Pilot 
In 2012-13, the Environment Agency in England ran a trial of an Assurance Scheme for 
use in the Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR) over 30 sites in six main industry 
sectors. Earned recognition in the scheme was based on firms voluntarily disclosing 
details of their environmental management system, which could lead to less frequent 
inspections by the regulator. The focus of our analysis is on lessons learnt from the trial, 
how it compares to similar international initiatives and the role of a regulator with respect to 
third party certification schemes.  
Findings 
In this section, we report the joint findings of our rapid evidence assessment and case 
studies. First, we begin with an overview of the schemes we identified through the rapid 
evidence assessment. Second, we identify a variety of contingencies that may impact on 
the effectiveness of information-based regulation schemes. Third we summarise the roles 
that regulators can play in information-based regulation schemes identified in the 
academic literature. We then go on to develop a new typology of information-based 
regulation schemes. The section concludes with three illustrative cases of how each type 
of scheme works in practice, including some insights on the roles of regulators in the 
different types of schemes. 
Overview of papers in the REA 
Of the 124 papers included in the final REA database, 71 (57%) were published in 2008 or 
later (see Figure 2). This indicates a growing interest in academic research in information-
based regulation over the past few years, with 15 of the papers published in 2014 alone. 
Of the policy areas considered in this report, the environment is the most represented area 
(62%), followed by food (23%) and energy (15%). Environment has dominated the 
literature from the mid-1990s when economists began researching the US EPA’s Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI). A more recent resurgence of interest in information-based 
approaches in food policy (12 papers in 2012-14 alone) mostly addresses the potential of 
labels on food packaging to encourage businesses to formulate and market healthier food 
options.  
 Figure 2: Number of papers published each year on information-based regulation 
(1976 - 2014) 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of empirical papers across countries 
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Figure 3 shows that North America dominates the examples and case studies with 52 
publications based on US data. Almost all of the studies published before 2000 were 
based on US schemes. 17 publications attempted comparative analyses of schemes 
across two or more countries (marked as International). Canada and European Union 
were identified as the focus in 7 papers each, with 6 studies focusing on the UK. The rest 
of the countries contributed 5 or fewer examples each in the papers. There is a more 
recent emergence of research on information-based regulation in Asian countries such as 
China, Indonesia and the Philippines and even a paper on targeted transparency schemes 
in oil and gas developments in Ghana. 
Overview of schemes 
The US EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is by far the most researched scheme, with 
over 10% of the papers addressing this single scheme. As Table 2 shows, the TRI and 
other pollutant release and transfer registers (PRTRs) are the most frequently researched 
schemes in the environmental policy area. Also prominent are auditing schemes, where 
the emphasis is on firms following agreed processes to evaluate their performance and 
declare their own results to either the regulator or on a public register. These include 
energy audits aimed at assessing firms’ energy efficiency, compliance audits that assess 
whether firms are currently in compliance with all relevant environmental regulation, and 
also environmental audits assessing firms’ environmental practices and outcomes as part 
of a broader environmental management system. Audits are particularly common in so-
called ‘self-policing’ regimes such as in the USA and Australia, where compliance 
enforcement is assured more through firms monitoring their own performance than by 
frequent inspections. Research investigating corporate reporting and industry-led schemes 
are also popular in the environmental domain.  
Table 2: Types of schemes studied by policy area 
  Energy  Environment    Food     Total 
Product labels 6 5 21 32 
Audits 6 15 0 21 
Pollutant registers (PRTRs) 0 17 0 17 
Corporate reporting 1 11 0 12 
Industry-led schemes 2 6 0 8 
Company ratings 1 0 2 3 
Management systems 0 2 0 2 
Total 16 56 23 95 
Note: Table includes papers based on a single, identifiable information-based regulation 
scheme only. 
 The food policy area is dominated by product labeling schemes (21 out of 23 papers with 
identifiable schemes). These include labels indicating information about the production of 
the product (e.g. organic, includes GMOs, country-of-origin) and/or nutritional information 
(e.g. front-of-pack calorie labels, allergen contents). Company rating schemes include 
restaurant hygiene grading schemes and other schemes that publicly disclose a large set 
of firms’ policy performance (e.g. disclosure of proportion of renewable fuels produced by 
energy companies). All three of the company ratings scheme papers are recently 
published studies based on US data.  
Examining the trends in methods used over time suggests that the quality of research 
evidence is improving. All but four of the pre-2000 studies were either conceptual 
discussions of information-based regulation, or formal theoretical models of how social 
actors may react to different informational states. Since 2006, the papers demonstrate 
increasing methodological complexity including formal content analyses of firms’ 
disclosures, robust mixed-method case studies, qualitative analyses of interviews with 
stakeholders and surveys of both information users and disclosers. While this may signal 
an increasing academic interest in uncovering the workings of schemes with specific 
designs, there are still too few formal evaluation studies in the academic literature. As a 
result, we are currently only able to broadly distinguish several common effects of 
information-based regulation at the individual, the firm and the society level (see Figure 4). 
Further research would be required to provide a more nuanced analysis. 
Figure 4: Frequently studied effects of information-based regulation 
 
Information-based regulation effectiveness 
The literature suggests a variety of contingencies when information-based regulation may 
be appropriate. Caution is warranted in drawing these conclusions, due to the paucity of 
formal evaluation studies. Having said this, several key themes emerge from across the 
body of evidence on contexts where information-based regulation may be a preferred 
alternative to other regulatory approaches such as command-and-control direct regulation 
or market-based mechanisms. Further details and useful reviews are provided in Mitchell 
(2011), Fung et al. (2007) and Gouldson et al. (2008). Table 3 summarises the main 
findings of this section. 
Individual level 
•  Consumer choice 
•  Willingness to pay 
a price premium 
for high quality / 
low risk firms or 
products 
•  Community right to 
know and 
reassurance 
•  Consumer 
confusion 
Firm level 
•  Regulatory 
compliance 
•  Compliance 
intentions 
•  Shareholder and 
market reactions 
•  Firm exit from 
industry 
•  Changes in non-
participating firms’ 
behaviours 
Society level 
•  Shift in liability 
•  Change in power 
dynamics 
•  Welfare gain or 
loss 
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Issue risk  
Information-based regulation seems to be the preferred approach when the hazard posed 
by the policy problem – whether it is local pollution, foodborne illness or obesity – presents 
low to medium risk. Information-based regulation works best when the performance bar is 
set quite low (Uchida, 2007) and should only be used as a supplementary measure where 
there is significant risk of environmental harm as it is not as effective as command-and-
control in enforcing a given policy goal (Bizer & Julich, 1999). For example, Coestier 
(2005) shows that if the expected damage arising from the hazard is not too high, then 
mandatory labeling is more socially optimal than either an outright ban or no regulation. 
Consumer and stakeholder interest 
Information-based regulation is particularly effective in changing behaviours when the 
disclosure is highly salient to the information user. Stakeholder interest is a common driver 
of information disclosure (Huang & Kung, 2010), but stakeholders are not interested in 
disclosures about different topics to the same degree (Ibanez & Stenger, 2000). For 
example, consumers are more likely to pay attention to restaurant food hygiene scores 
when eating out with vulnerable people such as people with health problems (Vegeris & 
Smeaton, 2014). Although theory suggests that information-based regulation should be 
more effective when broader stakeholders are interested in the information (Fung et al., 
2007), empirical evidence does not show a strong link between stakeholder interest and 
participation in audit schemes (Darnall, Seol, & Sarkis, 2009). Thus, the extent to which 
information-based regulation can generate stakeholder pressure on poorly performing 
firms crucially depends on the extent to which social actors actively pay attention to firm 
performance (Arora & Cason, 1999; Lee, Lejano, & Connelly, 2013). 
Firm incentives  
Information-based regulation can work when firms have other incentives to disclose the 
information aside from regulatory compliance. Such complementary incentives can include 
a direct willingness-to-pay by consumers for products that are indicated to have a higher 
social or environmental quality (for a review of willingness to pay for ecolabels, see 
Gallastegui, 2002). More common are diffuse indirect pressures where information-based 
schemes tap into reputational and legitimacy effects, particularly for large, visible firms 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Gouldson et al., 2008). For example, in their empirical 
investigation of the US Department of Energy’s voluntary greenhouse gas registry, Kim 
and Lyon (2011) found that large firms with strong regulatory pressure were the most likely 
to participate. The costs and benefits of information disclosure schemes may mitigate 
against adoption, and in such cases regulators may have a role to play in better aligning 
information-based schemes with firm-level incentives to ensure their success (Golan, 
Kuchler, Mitchell, Greene, & Jessup, 2001). 
Information simplicity  
Several studies emphasise that information-based regulation works best when key 
information can be presented simply, succinctly and consistently (Banerjee & Solomon, 
2003; Gouldson et al., 2008). In the context of front-of-package nutritional information, for 
example, simplicity is vital as consumers make quick decisions when shopping for food 
(Kees, Royne, & Cho, 2014). In their comparative study of five eco-labels Banerjee and 
Solomon (2003) demonstrated that simple ‘seal-of-approval’ labels tend to affect consumer  
 Table 3: Summary of effectiveness factors in information-based regulation  
 
  Contingency     Consideration for information-based regulation 
Issue risk − More appropriate for low-medium risk policies.  
− Should only be used as a supplement for high-risk issues. 
Consumer and 
stakeholder interest 
− More effective if stakeholders have a high interest. 
− Pressure on poorly performing firms depends on how 
social actors pay attention to firm performance. 
Firm incentives  − Works better when firms have incentives to disclose other 
than regulatory compliance.  
− The costs and benefits of information disclosure schemes 
may mitigate against adoption. 
Information 
simplicity 
− Works best when key information can be presented 
simply, succinctly and consistently. 
− More difficult when the information relates to highly 
complex or abstract ideas. 
Trust and credibility − Trust and credibility are vital for an information-based 
scheme to work. 
− Credibility includes scheme ownership, stakeholder 
dialogue, traceability, transparency and other features 
required to satisfy both information providers and users. 
Timing − Most powerful when information is disclosed at the right 
time and as close as possible to decision-making. 
Commitment and 
involvement 
− Commitment to the scheme is needed both by government 
agencies facilitating the scheme and lead participants. 
− Sufficient administrative capacity is necessary for 
government-led schemes. 
Senior managers − Managerial perceptions and responses are a vital part of 
compliance behaviours.  
− Firms are more likely to learn when senior managers 
embrace disclosure as an opportunity rather than a threat. 
Decoupling and 
greenwashing  
− Cannot work when information disclosed is disconnected 
from the underlying firm behaviours or impacts. 
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choices more than complex information disclosures. Information-based regulation is more 
difficult when the information relates to highly complex or abstract ideas as consumers 
struggle with assessing risk (Hadfield & Thomson, 1998). Indeed, the extent to which 
information conveyed through product labels offers consumer choice or simply fuels 
consumer confusion is subject to fraught academic debate (Horne, 2009). 
Trust and credibility 
Both the overall scheme and the specific information provided needs to be trusted by 
users and credible for an information-based scheme to work. The credibility of the scheme 
includes scheme ownership, stakeholder dialogue, traceability, transparency and other 
features that might lead to satisfy both information providers and users (Nilsson, Tunçer, & 
Thidell, 2004). For example, Fischer and Lyon (2014) modelled the effects of voluntary 
eco-labels promoted by NGOs compared with industry, showing better social outcomes for 
the more trusted, NGO eco-labels. Banerjee and Solomon (Banerjee & Solomon, 2003) 
showed that government-backed energy efficiency labels were far more effective than 
industry-led schemes in influencing consumer behaviour.  
Timing  
Information-based regulation is most powerful when information is disclosed at the right 
time, that is, close to the time of decision-making (Fung et al., 2007). Restaurant hygiene 
rating schemes, for example, are proposed to be effective because the restaurant score is 
available to the consumer at the time that they walk in to the restaurant (Ho, 2012). 
Similarly, Delmas et al. (2013) observed most changes in energy efficiency behaviours if 
users were provided real-time feedback on their current energy performance. Several 
disclosure schemes have lacked effectiveness because the relevant information is 
displayed at a time or place remote from the information user’s decision. 
Commitment and involvement 
Successful information-based regulation requires commitment to the scheme itself by lead 
actors, whether these are government agencies facilitating the scheme or lead participants 
(Gouldson et al., 2008). Government-sanctioned schemes require sufficient administrative 
capacity to maintain its functioning (Lee et al., 2013). Research suggests that schemes 
that require high involvement from information disclosers (e.g. energy audits) are 
successful partly because the process of engaging with the scheme increases issue 
salience for decision-makers (Delmas et al., 2013). When deciding to produce a voluntary 
corporate environmental report, for example, procedural commitment strengthens the 
likelihood of firm behaviour change and is ultimately rewarded with higher firm reputation 
(Philippe & Durand, 2011). 
Senior managers  
Lewis et al. (2014) demonstrated that firms that are led by general managers with MBAs 
rather than lawyers are more likely to participate in information-based schemes. This 
finding may be partly due to the litigious context in USA from where they derived their 
empirical data. However, it may apply more broadly since managerial perceptions and 
responses are a vital part of compliance behaviours. One of the primary mechanisms of 
information-based regulation is to facilitate firms’ internal learning (Lee, 2010; Mitchell, 
 2011), and such learning is more likely to occur when senior managers embrace 
disclosure as an opportunity rather than a threat (Sharma, 2000). 
Decoupling and greenwashing  
Information-based regulation cannot work in contexts where there is significant potential 
for decoupling and greenwashing. One of the biggest problems with information-based 
schemes is that the disclosure scheme itself becomes the focus of attention rather than 
the ultimate outcomes of managing risks to the public or increasing quality standards 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). Decoupling occurs when the information disclosed 
has become disconnected from the underlying firm behaviours or impacts, so that the 
information is ‘merely symbolic’ (Bowen, 2014). Examples can be found across all three of 
the policy domains. For example, although the US DOE’s voluntary greenhouse gas 
registry encouraged voluntary reporting of emissions, participating firms increased 
emissions over time but reported reductions (Kim & Lyon, 2011).  
Roles for regulators 
One of the primary aims of our project was to collate and evaluate the research evidence 
on the roles of regulators in information-based regulation. In this section we draw together 
the roles that regulators can play in this new set of regulatory alternatives. Although we 
undertook a systematic and thorough review of the literature, very few studies directly 
addressed regulators’ roles. Most emphasized the role of regulators in deciding whether 
disclosure is voluntary or mandatory, but added little beyond this on the nuances of 
regulators’ roles (but see Esty 2004 for a notable exception).  
Overall, the academic literature suggested at least six primary roles regulators might play 
in information-based regulation (see Table 4). The main role for regulators in information-
based regulation is to set the regulatory framework. Regulators can require mandatory 
disclosure of a firm’s performance to be published either in online inventories (as in the 
TRI and other PRTRs), or displayed on the product or service itself (e.g. FSA Food 
Hygiene Rating Scheme in Wales). Regulators can also play a role in setting the 
regulatory framework in voluntary schemes by providing incentives for firms to disclose 
(Esty 2004). In the case of the US EPA’s Audit Policy, the scheme provides explicit 
incentives for voluntary disclosure through regulatory relief. Softer incentives for disclosure 
may arise through regulatory support of voluntary pledges. For example, the UK 
Department of Health’s (DoH) Public Health Responsibility Deal encourages voluntary 
disclosure about food products within an implicit regulatory threat that if voluntary 
disclosure does not alter firm behaviour then mandatory measures might follow.  
Regulators can also shape voluntary disclosure schemes by setting information standards. 
The UK’s Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), for example, has 
developed guidelines on when firms can legitimately claim carbon neutrality. Similarly, 
Defra has developed Green Claims Guidance to set standards for environmental 
information about products and firms. More broadly, regulators play a vital function in 
network governance and information exchange through participating in multi-stakeholder 
and multi-national agreements to promote international harmonisation (Sheldon & Roe, 
2009). Finally, regulators can help set the framework through signalling policy priorities 
through public policy reports (Ghani, Childs, & Szewczyk, 2007) and other mechanisms 
such as their own strategic plans (Giles 2013).  
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The second primary role for regulators is to make government data widely accessible. 
Public authorities may be able to gain economies of scale in data collection and then share 
these informational economies for the broader public benefit (Esty 2004). This role is most 
obvious in PRTRs such as the TRI or Defra’s ambient air quality and other indicators on 
the UK-AIR website. However, simply collating the data is not enough: there can be 
considerable technical challenges and time delays in making public data available. In the 
case of the TRI, for example, data released is typically lagged by a year as data is 
reported by July 1st based on the previous year’s emissions, and then takes a further few 
months to be released. An example of good practice is the Food Standards Agency’s 
(FSA) online Food Hygiene Ratings database that is presented in the Application 
Programming Interface (API) format. This separates the role of the FSA in collecting and 
making the FHRS data available from the role of other information intermediaries such as 
smartphone app developers in processing and visualising the data for other uses.  
Table 4: Main roles for regulators identified in the literature  
  Main role     Indicative activities 
1. Setting the framework − Require mandatory disclosure 
− Provide incentives for firms to disclose 
− Recommending or proposing voluntary 
guidelines 
− Set information standards 
− Participating in multi-stakeholder and multi-
national agreements 
− Signalling policy priority 
2. Making government 
information widely accessible 
− Developing standard indicators 
− Maintaining online databases 
3. Developing public 
information programmes 
− Public education campaigns 
− Providing technical assistance to firms 
− Developing robust frameworks for audit 
processes 
4. Delegating authority to a third 
party standard-setting body 
− Funding and/or endorsing standards 
organisations 
5. Assuring others’ information − Endorsing others’ guidelines 
− Assuring a third-party scheme 
− Improving data credibility 
− Guarding against disinformation 
6. Formatting, displaying, 
aggregating data 
− Formatting and merging data 
− Standard-setting for data formats 
 
 A third role for regulators is a traditional role in supporting information and education 
programmes to augment other regulatory efforts. The role of the regulator in information 
programmes is to address problems of imperfect information, rather than the more usual 
information asymmetry of disclosure programmes (Mitchell 2011). Regulators may have a 
role in providing social actors with information designed to remedy their lack of knowledge 
and so influence their behaviours. Such education programmes can be targeted at firms 
through technical assistance or providing frameworks for audit processes (Reibstein 2008; 
Anderson 2004). Alternatively, they may be directed at consumers, as was the case with 
the FSA’s ‘Look before you book’ campaign, which encouraged consumers to be aware of 
food hygiene scores as they chose restaurants around Valentine’s Day. 
A fourth role for regulators is delegating authority to a third-party certification or standard-
setting body. In the case of the EPR Assurance Pilot case outlined below, the Environment 
Agency explored the possibility of delegating assurance for EPR compliance to the ISO, 
which is responsible for the ISO 14001 environmental management system rules. 
Expanding such a scheme may require authority to be formally delegated to agencies such 
as the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, which currently certifies professionals 
with a range of vocational qualifications in food safety, environmental management and 
related areas. Others have suggested that regulators facilitate information-based 
regulation by setting up credible information clearinghouses, a so-called ‘National Institute 
for the Environment’ (Esty 2004), to provide independent guidance and unbiased data, 
evidence and recommendations. Such an authority could function similar to the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the health sector in England.  
The fifth role for regulators is to assure others’ information. Rather than delegate authority 
to a third-party organisation, regulators could selectively endorse or assure others’ 
guidelines. For example, firms can meet their statutory UK Renewable Transport Fuel 
Obligation by demonstrating compliance to specific qualifying standards that are 
advocated, designed and operated by a range of non-statutory organisations (Upham et al. 
2011). Another way in which regulators may assure others’ information is through 
improving data credibility. Various studies within our database emphasised new roles for 
regulators in publishing complaints, finding outliers, making complaints easier to process, 
ensuring credibility, undertaking public enquiries and setting data accuracy requirements 
to assure the quality of others’ information and to guard against disinformation (e.g. Esty, 
2004; Marchi & Hamilton, 2006; Agrell and Niknazar, 2014; Hoek and King, 2008). This 
role requires regulators to develop new capabilities and relationships in intermediation, 
standard-setting, testing, certification and enforcement. 
Finally, regulators may play a technical role in formating, displaying and aggregating data 
from a variety of sources. Bae et al. (2010) demonstrated that how state regulators 
processed TRI data played a critical role in achieving the TRI’s intended policy goal of 
better information to end users. They argue that simply making more data available can 
counter-productive and conclude that state data processing efforts help more than the 
information disclosure itself. Regulators could help aggregate and visualise data through 
online energy use calculators, or develop data integration protocols such as the 
Environment Agency’s CLEAR Info project (EA 2014). 
Taken together, Table 4 shows that regulators can play an expanding range of roles in 
information-based schemes that may be used to assure regulatory compliance. A primary 
contribution of our report is to draw these together into a single framework for the first time. 
 27 
 
Types of information-based regulation 
Since the academic literature on information-based regulation has only recently begun to 
gain momentum, few previous studies have been able to synthesise the literature to 
identify different types. In this section, we introduce a new typology of information-based 
regulation based on two dimensions: whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, 
and on whether disclosure is about compliance or beyond compliance behaviours. 
First, schemes vary in the target performance standard expected of participating firms. The 
‘compliance’ category indicates whether the information is about firm behaviour at a basic 
compliance standard, above which no further compliance enforcement activity is required. 
The ‘beyond compliance’ category indicates firm performances at a level higher, or sooner, 
than required by basic regulatory compliance. For example, firms may display 
environmental permits or chemical hazards labels to demonstrate that they are in 
compliance with the relevant legislation. Other information schemes such as the ISO 
14001 environmental management system, organic food labels or EnergyStar energy 
efficiency ratings may indicate that a firm’s performance is higher than the basic legal 
compliance bar and current regulatory norms. Some graded schemes include information 
about different performance levels, ranging from triggering enforcement actions through 
broadly compliant to very good compliance performance (e.g. the FSA’s FHRS).  
The vast majority (82%) of the papers addressed compliance-level firm quality standards. 
Only 20 papers addressed the potential of using information about beyond compliance 
behaviours in a regulatory context. Examples include using information from the 
EnergyStar labelling scheme to benchmark minimum energy efficiency performance 
(Boyd, Dutrow, & Tunnessen, 2008), or participation in an environmental management 
scheme to provide some regulatory relief (Glachant, Schucht, Bültmann, & Wätzold, 2002).  
The relative scarcity of studies on using beyond compliance information for regulatory 
purposes also reflects that this is a new and emerging policy area with comparatively few 
schemes currently in operation. Traditionally, regulators have understandably emphasised 
compliance level behaviours as an indicator of compliance assurance and enforcement. 
However, considering beyond compliance behaviours can also be useful for compliance 
assurance and enforcement, as they can indicate firms’ pro-social philosophy, positive 
employee and customer relations, and reputation underlying sound compliance 
performance (Paddock & Wentz, 2014).  
Second, all schemes are based on either mandatory or voluntary disclosures. In a 
mandatory disclosure scheme, revealing the information is required by statutory 
instrument, formal regulations or is automatically disclosed by the regulator. In contrast, 
voluntary disclosure schemes may offer optional participation in the scheme or the 
possibility of disclosing information though opting in to a broader statutory scheme. In 
voluntary disclosure schemes, disclosure may be encouraged or collated by regulators or 
by others, but disclosure is not mandatory within the regulatory framework. For example, 
businesses may voluntarily disclose their environmental performance through an 
environmental report, putting an eco-label on their product or revealing non-compliance 
incidents at their facilities in a compliance audit.  
 In our set of papers, the same numbers of papers reported on voluntary (47 papers) and 
mandatory (47 papers) schemes, and 26 papers addressed both. Mandatory disclosure 
schemes dominated the earlier literature, with voluntary disclosure schemes only 
appearing in the academic literature from the late-1990s. A few publications compare the 
theory and practice of mandatory compared with voluntary schemes (e.g. Golan et al., 
2001; Horne, 2009).  
Table 5 illustrates a new matrix that helps to identify different types of information-based 
regulation based on these primary distinctions. The vertical axis represents whether the 
firms are required to disclose the information. The horizontal axis represents the 
performance quality standard that the firm is disclosing about. For the purposes of this 
project, we were most interested in schemes that departed from the mandatory disclosure 
of compliance-level information to schemes that include some element of raising 
performance standards (Type 1), using voluntarily disclosed information (Type 2) or both 
(Type 3).  
 
Table 5: Types of information-based regulation 
  Behaviour quality standard 
  Compliance Beyond compliance 
 
 
 
Disclosure 
requirement 
Voluntary Type 2: 
Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Audit Policy 
Type 3: 
Environment Agency’s EPR 
Assurance Scheme 
 Mandatory Traditional: 
Chemical hazard labels 
Type 1: 
Food Standard Agency’s 
Food Hygiene Rating 
Scheme in Wales 
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Illustrative cases 
In this section, we present illustrative cases of each of types of information-based 
regulation identified in Table 5, and how they are operating in practice as revealed through 
interviews and secondary sources during Phase 2 of our study. 
Type 1 in practice: The Food Hygiene Rating Scheme in Wales (mandatory 
and beyond compliance) 
Background 
Since November 2010, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) has operated a Food Hygiene 
Rating Scheme (FHRS) in partnership with local authorities in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (the Food Hygiene Information Scheme (FHIS) operates in Scotland). 
Following inspection by a food safety officer from the local authority, food businesses are 
given a ‘hygiene rating’ ranging from 0 (urgent improvement necessary) to 5 (very good). 
The top end of the scale reflects levels of confidence in management, hygiene standards 
and cleanliness beyond those that might usually trigger a regulatory enforcement action 
(beyond compliance). 
The FSA hosts a website listing the detailed ratings for all food outlets and makes the 
ratings available to developers and other third parties via a specialised Application 
Programming Interface (API). Overall evidence about the scheme in England and Wales 
within the period 2011-2014 suggests that it has stimulated an increase in compliance 
amongst food businesses; it is however difficult to conclude about its impact on numbers 
of food-borne illnesses (Salis et al. 2015). The finer-grained scale than a simple 
compliance-based pass/fail standard has been popular with consumers, since they 
appreciate that “hygiene standards are not black and white” (Vergeris and Smeaton, 2014: 
33). 
Scheme Operation 
Display of food hygiene ratings is currently voluntary in England and Northern Ireland with 
food businesses encouraged to display a sticker and/or certificate showing their rating in a 
publically visible location. Display of food hygiene ratings has been mandatory in Wales 
since November 2013. From the date of this change, food businesses in Wales received a 
new FHRS sticker that had to be displayed in a prominent place such as the front door, 
window or entrance to the premises. The legislation also introduced a new requirement for 
food businesses to confirm their hygiene rating verbally when asked, ensuring that this 
information is shared with all employees.   
The FSA in Wales has a duty to oversee and evaluate 
the implementation of the scheme including promoting 
the scheme to consumers and food businesses and 
providing support to local authorities to comply with 
their new responsibilities. The implementation of the 
statutory scheme also included requirements for an 
appeal process, a right to reply by food businesses that 
can be published on the FSA website and an 
opportunity to request a rerating inspection at a cost of 
£150. Motivation for the statutory scheme came from 
 observations that ratings below 4 or 5 were simply not displayed in the FSA’s voluntary 
scheme so consumers were missing this information unless making an effort to search for 
it in the online database. Being required to display the sticker would also provide an 
important incentive for business to improve their standards. 
Effectiveness 
A review of the scheme’s first 12 months of operation (FSA Wales 2015) suggests that 
there is significant increase in hygiene rating scores across the country: 56% of Welsh 
food businesses had a rating of 5 (from 45% prior to the introduction of mandatory display) 
with 93% having a rating of 3, 4 or 5 (up from 87%). The scheme is almost unanimously 
visible amongst consumers who are in their great majority in favour of mandatory display. 
Appeals against ratings were made in 0.5% of cases and 21% of appeals resulted in 
changes to food hygiene ratings. There were 50 incidents of non-compliance with 
mandatory display of stickers with fines in the range of £150 - £200. Following 718 
requests for re-rating inspections, 94.8% of businesses resulted in a higher ratings, 3.8% 
stayed the same and 1.4% resulted in a lower rating. More recent updates about the 
scheme outline similar effects. Therefore, there is good evidence to suggest that 
mandatory display of FHRS stickers increase efforts to achieve higher compliance scores 
while leading to wide-reaching consumer awareness. However, there remains a risk that 
standards at individual businesses might slip after they have achieved good ratings, or that 
the scheme may be subject to grade inflation over time (Salis et al. 2015). 
Roles of Regulators 
The scheme required new roles and expectations from both the Food Standards Agency, 
which designed the scheme, and Local Authorities, who had a new statutory duty to 
implement it. For example, the underlying IT platform for the rating scheme was developed 
and provided by the FSA, but individual local authorities needed to manage the database 
of inspection results (Thompson, 2011). Since local authorities were required to notify food 
businesses and input the results of all inspections into the database within 14 days, they 
needed to become “slicker and quicker” in their internal admin processes (Thompson, 
2011: 3). The FSA took the lead in consultations with business and in raising consumer 
awareness through public information campaigns during the launch of the scheme. 
A significant challenge was consistency in training and inspections. The implementation of 
the scheme requires coordination to ensure that a consistent inspection approach is in 
place by local authorities. This coordination effort did impose some administrative costs on 
local authorities, but was kept at reasonable levels given that there are 22 local authorities 
(councils) in Wales compared, for example, to England’s 269 non-metropolitan districts, 
metropolitan and London Boroughs. In terms of inspection resources, the scheme 
implementation requires that all facilities have to be inevitably and periodically inspected. 
However, the new scheme gave an option to food businesses to pay for voluntary re-
inspections, hence enabling local authorities to recover part of the cost.  
Future Developments 
Overall, this positive experience from Wales builds on the work of the FSA to design and 
implement the scheme since 2010 across the UK. The Northern Ireland Assembly has 
plans to make the display of FHRS stickers mandatory (Northern Ireland Assembly 2014). 
It will be important to assess the longer-term impact of both schemes with regards to 
impacts on public health and the economic performance of food businesses. 
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Type 2 in practice: The Audit Policy of the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (voluntary and compliance) 
Background 
In 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the USA launched a policy on 
‘Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of 
Violations’, commonly known as the EPA Audit Policy. The policy provides guidelines for 
waiving or reducing penalties for compliance violations if firms voluntarily and promptly 
disclose non-compliance discovered through a systematic auditing programme and 
cooperate with the US EPA throughout. Other policy conditions that need to be met 
include prompt correction and remediation, measures to avoid re-occurrence and no 
repeat violations. The EPA’s Audit Policy has been one of the most visible ‘self-policing’ 
schemes with an accumulated experience of 20 years. It complements other well-known 
information-based schemes by the US EPA such as the Toxic Release Inventory. 
Scheme Operation 
The policy’s guidelines apply to whether the firm is in 
compliance with current regulatory requirements (e.g. 
hazardous waste regulations; Clean Air Act). There are 
three main incentives for disclosure: (1) significant 
penalty reductions, (2) no recommendation for criminal 
prosecution when all conditions are met and (3) no 
routine requests for audit reports to trigger enforcement 
investigations. There is a network of ten different regions 
across the country where the scheme is implemented 
under the oversight and coordination of the federal EPA. 
Individual states might have slightly different approaches 
to the specifics of disclosures and managing the process 
as long as they comply with the broader federal policy 
framework.  
Since the introduction of the policy, the EPA has received disclosures from over 7,700 
entities at over 21,000 facilities. The majority of disclosures have resulted in compliance 
with reporting requirements that assure community right-to-know. All compliance issues 
are made available through the Enforcement Compliance History Online database once 
they are resolved.  
Effectiveness 
The EPA has not conducted its own formal evaluation of the policy since the required 3-
year review in 1999, which led to the issuance of the 2000 Audit Policy that updated the 
1995 policy in a number of respects. However, as arguably the most famous self-policing 
audit scheme internationally, the EPA’s Audit Policy has been the subject of several 
academic papers. In a large-scale empirical study using data from 19,983 facilities in 
1991-2003, Toffel and Short (2011) conclude that firms that voluntarily disclosed 
regulatory violations under the Audit Policy improved their regulatory compliance and 
environmental performance. Stretesky and Lynch (2008) found that facilities that use the 
Audit Policy have similar subsequent emissions trends as those that do not use the policy, 
showing that self-policing neither improves or deteriorates environmental performance in 
the chemical and allied products industry. Others have noted the tendency to only disclose 
 minor infractions through the Audit Policy scheme. Studies have also found that firms are 
more likely to disclose under the Audit Policy if they face a higher probability of inspection 
(Stafford 2007), or only after regulators had already committed a disproportionate amount 
of enforcement resources to inspect and prosecute them (Short and Toffel 2008). Thus, 
the policy appears to be most effective when it operates ‘in the shadow of the regulator’. 
Roles of Regulators 
Since disclosures are voluntary, the regulator does not have direct control of the flow or 
format of information received from firms, so the staff at the EPA’s Office of Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance (OECA) have needed to develop routines to cope with 
inconsistent and unpredictable information disclosures. In general, engagement around 
the implementation of the policy tends to come from the industry itself and the surrounding 
legal experts, rather than other stakeholders like environmental or consumer groups. Thus 
OECA staff also developed relationships with networks of corporate legal counsel who 
have experience of managing disclosures under the scheme. Such relationships have 
been useful to gain informal feedback on the operation of the Audit Scheme and to 
disseminate information about scheme changes. 
Administrative costs to the EPA remain reasonably high since every disclosure has to be 
evaluated; there are also additional enquiries from firms about meeting the requirements 
and understanding the disclosure process. Having said this, the interview respondents at 
the EPA implied that the emphasis on encouraging companies to monitor their internal 
processes and providing incentives to cooperate may have lowered the overall cost of 
enforcement. 
Future Developments 
Future plans about the Audit Policy are in accordance with the Next Generation 
Compliance Agenda (Giles, 2015). The so-called “Next Gen” agenda emphasizes the use 
of advanced monitoring tools, independent third party verification of compliance with 
settlement regulations, electronic reporting and increased transparency of compliance 
data. Feedback from industry suggests high interest in approaches that are based on 
advanced monitoring tools and a good level of commitment from good environmental 
performers. For more details on “Next Gen” at the US EPA, see Paddock and Wentz 
(2014). 
 
Type 3 in practice: Environment Agency’s EPR Assurance Scheme (voluntary 
and beyond compliance) 
 
Background 
The Environmental Permitting System in the England covers permits for 19,000 industrial 
facilities. This single regulatory framework covers permits related with waste management, 
pollution prevention and control, water discharge consents, groundwater authorisations 
and the regulation of radioactive substances. In 2012-13, the Environment Agency in 
England ran a trial of an Assurance Scheme for use in the Environmental Permitting 
Regulations (EPR) across 30 sites in six main industry sectors over 18 months (including 
food and drink, waste, chemicals and cement and minerals).  
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Scheme Operation 
One of the components of the scheme was to 
allow firms to demonstrate beyond 
compliance performance levels through an 
existing, certified environmental management 
scheme (e.g. having an ISO 14001 
certification). Earned recognition was based 
on firms voluntarily disclosing details of their 
environmental management system, which 
could lead to less frequent inspections by the 
regulator. This was achieved via the 
introduction of an Annual Compliance 
Statement signed by the CEO (or equivalent) 
confirming that environmental performance and compliance is led at the highest level 
within companies. 
Effectiveness 
The Environment Agency commissioned a report to evaluate the scheme in May 2014 
(Environment Agency 2014). During the trial, there was no deterioration in overall average 
site compliance performance compared to the preceding two years or an increase in 
substantiated complaints. There was also an overall net reduction in the time that 
inspectors spent on audit and advice under the Assurance Scheme, indicating lower 
overall cost of inspection.  
There were wide variations in business responses on the scheme depending on the 
different industries that firms came from. All firms taking part were interested in earned 
recognition with almost all participants successfully completing the Annual Compliance 
Statement. However, firms were not able to clearly identify a reduction of administrative 
burden although it was widely stated that familiarity under a full scheme could improve 
this. Furthermore, firms that took part tended to have good prior compliance levels, 
suggesting that this scheme is not appropriate for poorly performing firms.  
Roles of Regulators 
The Assurance Scheme trial suggests a shift in the traditional role of regulators in earned 
recognition schemes. Traditional inspections present opportunities for inspectors to 
interact with and build relationships with firm representatives. The trial participants noted 
that they highly value the learning in these relationships, but that the pilot scheme did not 
offer informal assistance from inspectors during their visits. Instead, in an earned 
recognition scheme, regulators need to maintain good working relationships with 
certification bodies like the UK Accreditation Service. The skills and experience of 
certification bodies and third-party auditors might vary widely compared to a single 
inspection regime. Regulators play a vital role in ensuring that there is a unified approach 
to earned recognition that could gain acceptance by both firms and regulators.  
In the longer term, if earned recognition can work independently, then the regulator would 
face the challenge of redefining their role beyond assuring others’ standards. In this case, 
there may be alternative regulatory roles beyond enforcement like consultation services 
and advice, at least for groups of consistently top environmental performers.  
 Future Developments 
The Environment Agency decided not to roll out the EPR Assurance Scheme at scale 
because of the mixed experiences of businesses in different sectors in the pilot, and is 
continuing to explore the possibility of similar schemes in specific industries. The agency 
remains committed to the principle of earned recognition, and continues to develop their 
Future Regulation strategic programme. 
Lessons from the illustrative cases 
Comparing the workings, effectiveness and challenges faced by each of the three 
illustrative schemes suggests several lessons for regulators (see Table 6). Clearly, caution 
is warranted in generalising these insights due to the small sample of cases and the 
relatively limited data we accessed on each. Having said this, comparing the cases can 
give some starting points for future work on the roles of regulators in information-based 
regulation.  
First, the cases suggest that the underlying mechanism driving performance improvement 
is different in each case. For the mandatory, beyond compliance scheme (Food Hygiene 
Ratings), firm behaviour change is driven though the social and consumer pressure of 
making current performance highly visible. Stickers influence consumer awareness and 
choices; firms respond by striving for a high score and applying for re-inspection if their 
score is not high enough. In contrast, in the voluntary compliance scheme (EPA Audit 
Policy), compliance behaviours improve as firms audit their own activities and processes. 
The key mechanism here is internal learning, rather than an external driver from 
customers or other stakeholders. Indeed, in the EPA case, the scheme administrators 
were not aware of any interest from consumer or pressure groups in the scheme. In the 
voluntary, beyond compliance scheme (EA EPR Assurance), the goal is not so much to 
change current compliance behaviours, but rather to provide earned recognition and 
administrative relief for prior improvements. This highlights the importance of 
understanding which mechanism may drive behaviour change in a given context and 
designing the implementation of the scheme accordingly. 
The two voluntary schemes showed evidence of lower costs of enforcement and 
inspection, while achieving no deterioration on overall average compliance. The 
mandatory scheme showed evidence of improving compliance standards, but incurred 
some additional coordination costs to regulators (which were partly offset by cost 
recovery). While it is not possible to generalise these findings on costs and benefits to all 
voluntary or mandatory schemes, this pattern is worthy of further investigation in future 
studies. The preliminary lesson is that voluntary approaches may incur lower direct costs 
to the regulator, but also are less effective in improving compliance behaviours. Voluntary 
schemes are thus only appropriate in contexts where compliance performance is already 
quite good. 
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Table 6: Summary of the three illustrative cases  
 
Type 1: 
The Food Hygiene 
Rating Scheme in 
Wales 
Type 2: 
The Audit Policy of 
the US 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Type 3: 
Environment 
Agency’s EPR 
Assurance Scheme 
Disclosure 
requirement Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary 
Quality 
standard Beyond compliance  Compliance Beyond compliance 
Improvement 
mechanism 
Social pressure for 
improvement through 
naming and shaming 
Self-improvement 
through audit and 
learning 
Earned recognition 
for prior performance 
improvement 
Effectiveness  
− Evidence of 
improving 
compliance 
standards 
− Efficient focus on 
lowest performers, 
highest risk 
− Possibility to 
recover part of the 
cost 
− No deterioration 
in overall 
compliance levels  
− Lower overall 
cost of 
enforcement  
 
− No deterioration in 
overall site 
average 
compliance  
− No increase in 
complaints during 
the trial 
− Lower cost of 
inspection  
Challenges 
− Effort to maintain a 
standardised and 
consistent 
inspection approach 
with local authorities 
− Periodic inspection 
of all facilities 
required 
− Hard to measure 
public health 
outcome 
effectiveness 
− Minor infractions 
tend to be the 
ones that get 
disclosed 
− The policy works 
as a guideline, 
not as an 
enforceable 
promise  
− Only works well 
‘in the shadow of 
the regulator’ 
− Firms reported 
little or no savings 
in the trial 
− Some firms value 
face-to-face 
contact with 
inspectors	   
− Skills and 
experience of 
certification bodies 
and third-party 
auditors may vary 
widely 
 
 
 However, all the schemes also faced challenges. First, in both of the voluntary schemes, 
there is little scope for significant compliance improvements. For example, under the 
EPA’s Audit Policy, it is minor infractions that tended to be disclosed rather than major 
ones. Similarly, in the EPR Assurance Scheme, participating businesses tended to already 
have a strong compliance record. This can lead to an unintended focus on relatively minor 
compliance infractions and/or good performers, which is counter to the usual desire to 
expend more regulatory effort on the highest risk, worst performers.  
Second, both beyond compliance schemes struggled with standardisation and 
consistency. In the FSA’s Food Hygiene Rating Scheme considerable effort was required 
to train 200 local authority inspectors to evaluate the performance of food businesses 
against the FSA scheme’s criteria. The low number of businesses that requested a re-
inspection (0.5%) suggests that regulators coped with the consistency challenge well, but 
it did take considerable learning and effort as the scheme was launched. The EA’s EPR 
Assurance scheme also raised the issue of consistency, but this time in the skills and 
experience of certification bodies and third-party auditors. In a mandatory scheme, the 
consistency problem remains within the regulator; whereas in voluntary schemes the 
regulator must take a more active external role developing relationships and consistency 
with third-party auditors. 
Third, as in the rapid evidence assessment above, all three schemes work best ‘in the 
shadow of the regulator’. Direct involvement, or a credible commitment to direct 
intervention, is vital to underpin compliance performance. In the mandatory scheme this 
involvement is in the form of periodic inspections for all facilities to award new food 
hygiene stickers and scores. For the voluntary schemes, firms are more likely to 
participate if they face a higher probability of inspection, or only after regulators had 
already committed a disproportionate amount of enforcement resources to inspect and 
prosecute them. Indeed, in the EPR Assurance Scheme, some participating businesses 
stated that they would miss the face-to-face contact with inspectors that a more hands-off, 
information-based approach would provide. 
Finally, firms reported little or no savings compared with traditional regulation in the EPR 
Assurance trial. This is a common problem in information-based schemes. Information-
based schemes do not necessarily reduce overall administrative burden on firms because 
they still need to collect, assure and disclose information. 
Overall, the three illustrative cases provide some pointers for future research. Examining 
more schemes in action could help establish whether the initial findings here are 
generalisable. In particular, we would encourage further research on the links between 
types of information-based regulation and (1) whether performance improvements are 
driven by external social pressure or internal learning; (2) the relative costs and benefits of 
different scheme designs, including administrative burden on firms; and (3) credible 
regulatory commitments and the effectiveness of information-based regulation schemes. 
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Conclusion and future directions 
This is the first systematic review of information-based regulation in the environment, food 
and energy policy areas. We reviewed a set of 124 academic papers that have been 
published internationally, mostly since the 1990s. We outlined the trends in the 
information-based regulation literature by discipline, country, policy domain, method and 
strength of evidence. Our report develops a new typology of information-based regulation 
based on whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory, and whether the reported 
performance standard is based on the compliance or beyond compliance level. We 
outlined three case studies illustrating these types in practice. 
 
The roles of the regulator are evolving over time through the three generations of 
information-based regulation (see Table 7). Traditionally in the right-to-know era, the role 
of the regulator was primarily limited to making government information available and to 
disseminating public education programmes. The targeted transparency era challenged 
regulators to a range of new roles, primary among them setting the regulatory framework. 
Targeted transparency schemes such as the EPA’s TRI and the Audit Policy both required 
regulators to learn when to make firm disclosure mandatory, collating and maintaining 
official databases, and providing standardised guidelines for data quality and audit 
processes. 
Table 7: The changing roles of the regulator in information-based regulation  
Right-to-know  
(1960s onward) 
Targeted transparency  
(1980s onward) 
Smart Disclosure  
(2000s onward) 
− Making government 
information 
available 
− Public information 
programmes 
− Setting the regulatory 
framework 
− Collating and 
maintaining official 
databases 
− Improving data 
credibility 
− Developing audit 
processes 
− Delegating authority 
− Assuring others’ 
information 
− Formatting, displaying, 
aggregating data 
 
However, the new era of smarter disclosure requires a different set of regulatory 
capabilities. Sayogo and Pardo (2013) summarise the roles of regulators in the smart 
disclosure era as the identifier of opportunity, challenger for the industry and promoter of 
the initiative. The EPR Assurance Scheme is an example where regulators have needed 
to shift from controlling internal consistency within official inspections (as with the FSA’s 
FHRS) to developing relationships and consistency with delegated third part auditors. This 
implies striking a delicate balance between ceding direct control of gathering, collating and 
publishing firm performance data on the one hand, and providing sufficient assurance that 
information-based schemes are credible on the other.  
 The most consistent finding across the studies in our database is that information-based 
regulation works best ‘in the shadow of the regulator’. However, there is very little current 
research on how regulators can achieve this as they shift to shaping the decision context 
for firms, rather than directly collecting information from them. The new role for regulators 
in smarter disclosure is intermediary facilitation – regulators need to make it easier for 
consumers, investors, media, NGOs and others to access information they need to 
pressure and reward firms for good performance. More research is needed on how 
regulatory information can create public value in the smart disclosure era, and how 
regulators can harness others’ information to change firm behaviours and meet regulatory 
goals. 
Overall, despite theoretical enthusiasm, evidence that information-based regulation 
actually works is weak. There are too few formal evaluation studies, and even among a 
broader set of empirical papers, the effects and effectiveness of information-based 
regulation is not always clear. In particular, academic research is still vague about detailed 
antecedents and consequences of information-based regulation, with many opportunities 
for future evaluative and empirical research to test the various contingencies identified in 
this review.  
 
Our report is the first to explicitly address the roles of regulators in information-based 
regulation and how these are evolving. Future research should seek to integrate findings 
from the targeted transparency literature (where the regulatory goal is to decrease risk to 
public or raise performance standards) with contemporary research on open government 
(where emphasis is on adding public value through smarter disclosure). Drawing these 
together will help understand how regulators can best use information-based approaches 
as part of a broader suite of alternatives to direct regulation. 
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Technical appendix 
This section provides further details on the rapid evidence assessment conducted as 
phase 1 of this research.  
Rapid Evidence Assessment Question: What roles have regulators and 
their agencies played in using information to influence firms’ behaviours 
and strategies in the energy, environment and food policy areas? 
Given that the literature on ‘information-based regulation’ spreads across several 
disciplines and policy domains, we sought to identify all relevant academic sources that 
addressed the intersection between regulatory theory, information and behaviour change 
and corporate social strategy. We began with a ‘review of reviews approach’ to generate a 
list of core concepts. We then developed a list of keywords and variants to search for 
relevant journal articles. The EBSCO Business Source Complete database was selected 
as the primary source. The database contains the full text of nearly 2,000 peer-reviewed 
academic journals and is recognised as the most definitive scholarly, full-text business 
database. Given the wide literature base, we experimented with several variants of 
keywords to generate a manageable number of relevant sources.  
Figure 5: Search terms used in the Rapid Evidence Assessment 
 
 
Concept terms 
• information disclosure 
• corporate disclosure 
• mandatory disclosure 
• information-based 
• reporting 
• rating* 
• audit 
• scorecard 
• label* 
• screen* 
• social regulation 
• soft law 
• transparency 
Domain terms 
• enviro* 
• pollution 
• food 
• energy 
 Figure 6: Flowchart of the selection and screening process 
 
Table 8: Coding primary and secondary themes in academic papers 
Primary Theme Secondary Theme 
 Theory used Disciplinary base (economics, law, marketing, environment & planning etc.) 
 Theoretical frame (information asymmetry; socio-political legitimacy; norms and nudges etc.) 
Empirical features Country focus 
   Policy area (food, energy, environment) 
Scheme features Name 
 Disclosure mode (mandatory or voluntary) 
 Quality standard (compliance or beyond compliance) 
 Role of the regulator 
 Context and primary drivers 
 Effects and effectiveness 
Other Rigour and strength of evidence 
Academic 
literature  
citation 
search 
Screen 
abstract for 
relevance 
Screen full 
paper for 
relevance 
Content coding 
for selected 
papers 
9,716 papers 
211 papers 
124 papers 
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We searched all scholarly journals within the EBSCO Business Source Complete 
database in English for papers with the search terms in the title or abstract. The search 
terms included each combination of a concept term and a domain term from Figure 5. 
Initial searches generated a list of 9,716 abstracts, which were manually screened for 
relevance to our questions based on the paper abstract, yielding 211 full text papers. We 
then screened these based on full text, yielding a final sample of 124 papers (see Figure 
6). This set of papers was then coded based on the dimensions outlined in Table 8.  
The starting point in our analysis is to overview the titles of the 124 eventually selected in 
the database, which gives a first indication of their content. The word cloud in Figure 7 
provides prima facie evidence that the 124 papers addressed topics of relevance to our 
REA question. Words mentioned over 10 times in paper titles included: “Environmental” 
(48 papers), “Disclosure” (26 papers), “Information” (24 papers), “Food” (19 papers), 
“Regulation” (16 papers), “Energy” (15 papers), “Labelling” (15 papers), “Policy” (15 
papers), “Evidence” (13 papers) and “Mandatory” (11 papers). 
 
Figure 7: Word cloud of 124 paper titles 
 
 Figure 8: Distribution of 124 papers across policy areas and base disciplines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business and Management (including Accounting) and Economics are the most common 
base disciplines of the papers (see Figures 8 and 9). In recent years, there has been 
broad cross-disciplinary interest in information-based regulation, for example, papers from 
2014 were published in journals specializing in all but one of these disciplinary areas 
(public health). However, too few papers extend beyond their own narrow disciplinary 
focus and most rely on their core home discipline for theoretical guidance. 
Figure 9: Distribution of base disciplines of the papers
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Almost 40% of the papers are either conceptual discussions (27 papers) or descriptive 
case studies of the operation of particular schemes (20 papers), with little firm evidence of 
the scheme’s effects or effectiveness (see Figure 10). While a third of the papers are 
based on generating and then testing hypotheses (39 papers), these are more likely to test 
for drivers of participation in the first place than to test for performance outcomes. Most of 
the hypothesis-testing papers (29 out of 39) are based on US data, which offers large-
scale tests of facility-level TRI data and from the EPA’s Audit Policy. Only 11 studies 
contain relatively formal evaluation studies of information-based regulation schemes in 
practice – 8 from the USA and 3 from the EU. There are currently too few well-designed 
evaluation studies to be able to draw confident conclusions on when information-based 
regulation is effective.  
Figure 10: Primary method deployed in each of the papers 
 
 
  
Hypothesis 
testing 
32% 
Conceptual 
22% 
Case study 
17% 
Evaluation 
9% 
Modelling 
9% 
Qualitative 
7% 
Other 
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